Trade Protectionism and Intra-industry Trade: A USA - EU Comparison by Ferreira-Lopes, Alexandra et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Trade Protectionism and Intra-industry
Trade: A USA - EU Comparison
Alexandra Ferreira-Lopes and Caˆndida Sousa and Helena
Carvalho and Nuno Crespo
Instituto Universita´rio de Lisboa, ISCTE - IUL, BRU - IUL
(Business Research Unit), CIES
31. July 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49379/
MPRA Paper No. 49379, posted 30. August 2013 13:50 UTC
Trade Protectionism and Intra-industry Trade: A USA -
EU Comparison
Alexandra Ferreira-Lopesy, Cândida Sousaz, Helena Carvalhox, and Nuno Crespo{
July, 2013
Abstract
The aim of this work is to nd patterns for products included in the customs tari¤s of the
USA and the EU (composed of over 5000 products disaggregated at the 6 digit-level) which
share similarities, dened by a set of international trade variables, namely the index of revealed
comparative advantages (RCA), the Grubel-Lloyd index, and other indicators of international
trade. There is a recent strand in the literature advancing a theory that links the degree of
intra-industry trade with the level of protectionism. In order to test this theory we use cluster
analysis as a method of data analysis and the Grubel-Lloyd index as a classication variable
between groups. For each of the analyzed regions we obtain four di¤erent groups. Thereafter
each of these four clusters are further characterized with the help of the other international
trade indicators and the tari¤s. Finally, we establish a comparison between the two regions
by examining possible di¤erences and similarities. The results show a signicant di¤erence
in the tari¤s applied between the USA and the EU, with the USA presenting a lower level of
protectionism. Additionally, the results for the USA show a positive relationship between the
degree of intra-industry trade and a lower level of protectionism, while for the EU the results
are not conclusive.
Keywords: Trade Policy, Customs Tari¤, USA, EU, Intra-industry Trade, Cluster Analysis
JEL Codes: C38, F12, F13, F14
Alexandra Ferreira-Lopes, Helena Carvalho, and Nuno Crespo acknowledge the support from FCT. The authors
would like to thank Francisco Madelino for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
yCorresponding author. Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE - IUL), ISCTE Business School Economics
Department, BRU - IUL (BRU - Business Research Unit), Lisboa, Portugal, and CEFAGE - UBI. E-mail: alexan-
dra.ferreira.lopes@iscte.pt. Av. Forças Armadas 1649-026, Lisboa, Portugal, Tel: (351) 217903498.
zAT - Tax and Customs Authority and Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE - IUL), can-
dida.costa.sousa@at.gov.pt.
xInstituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE - IUL), Department of Social Research Methods and CIES-IUL.
helena.carvalho@iscte.pt. Av. Forças Armadas 1649-026, Lisboa, Portugal, Tel: (351) 217903454.
{Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE - IUL), ISCTE Business School Economics Department and BRU -
IUL (Business Research Unit), Lisboa, Portugal. E-mail: nuno.crespo@iscte.pt. Av. Forças Armadas 1649-026,
Lisboa, Portugal, Tel: (351) 217903477.
1
1 Introduction
The literature on trade protectionism has recently advanced a theoretical link, which has also
been tested empirically, postulating that the level of trade protectionism is lower in countries that
present a higher degree of intra-industry trade, i.e., if countries that are trading substitute goods
(even though imperfect), engage in protectionist measures, they may more easily su¤er retaliation,
and so this type of trade is a "brake" on these protectionist measures.
This work aims to study the relationship between the degree of intra-industry trade and the
level of trade protection in the USA and EU. The degree of intra-industry trade in this work is
measured by the Grubel-Lloyd (GL) index. This variable was used to perform a cluster analysis,
which was then characterized using the information about tari¤s, as well as additional indicators,
built with data on exports and imports to and from the world for each of these regions.
Much of the literature on protectionism focuses on measuring the costs of applying protective
measures and/or the degree of protectionism for each economy. The task of measuring the degree of
protectionism (and costs) is very di¢ cult, given the diversity of existing trade policy instruments.
There are, however, several studies that seek to do so, as can be seen in Cipollina and Salvatici
(2008). Traditionally, and given the di¢ culty, the trade policy instrument most commonly used
to measure the degree of protection is the tari¤, ad valorem and specic.1 Empirical studies of
this issue for the case of the USA and EU, respectively, can be found in the work of Hufbauer
and Elliot (1994) and Messerlin (2001). The work of Bouët et al. (2008) provides a measure of
protection, in percentage points, for several countries, including the USA and the EU. The results
for the two countries in 2001 were, respectively, 2.3 and 3.1%. This measure is lower, in both
regions, for industrial goods, and higher for agricultural and textile goods. However, the USA
is more protective vis-à-vis imports from developing countries, while the opposite occurs in the
EU, where protection is higher for imports from developed countries. For the year 2007, using
an update of the same database - MacMap-HS6 - Guimbard et al. (2012) found for the USA
and the EU, a total protection of 1.7 and 2.6%, respectively. In this latest study the level of
protection of the USA for agricultural goods and textiles increased slightly, while for industrial
goods it decreased, also slightly. For the EU the protection for agricultural goods fell sharply, and
the protection for industrial goods dipped slightly, with increased protection for textile goods.
Fontagné et al. (2005) and Evans (2007) relate the degree of protection of the countries with
the existence of a border e¤ect, i.e., there is empirical evidence showing that the intensity of
trade between regions of each country is greater than the intensity of trade of each country with
other countries. Both studies conclude that the degree of protectionism of a country is one of the
explanatory variables of this border e¤ect. The study by Fontagné et al. (2005) refers to the USA,
EU, and Japan, while Evans (2007) relates only to the USA.
The theory of tari¤ endogeneity claims that some macroeconomic variables and the countrys
own macroeconomic situation a¤ect the degree of protectionism, i.e., the strength of tari¤s varies
with a given set of factors. These factors inuence the setting of tari¤s via pressure groups (lobbies)
who seek to inuence its value (Baldwin, 1985). Pioneering work of empirical verication of this
1The specic rates are usually converted into ad valorem in such studies.
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theory can be found in Magee et al. (1989) and Bohara and Kaempfer (1991). The traditional
microeconomic analysis on tari¤s - via consumer, producer, and state surplus - states that tari¤s
also have e¤ects on prices, income, trade balance, and employment and unemployment rate by
sectors, among others. Thus, there may be feedback e¤ects between macroeconomic factors, the
macroeconomic situation, and tari¤s.
One of the factors that may a¤ect the setting of tari¤s is the predominant type of international
trade of a country, i.e., if the composition of exports and imports are goods produced in di¤erent
sectors - inter-industry trade, or if the composition of exports and imports are goods produced in
the same sectors - intra-industry trade. Marvel and Ray (1987) nd that in the presence of intra-
industry trade, the degree of protectionism is lower, since the groups interested in the imposition of
tari¤s (the producers of substitute goods, who sell to the domestic market) would su¤er retaliation
from those who produce substitute goods to export, if e¤ectively managed to increase protection.
Thus, the existence of intra-industry trade promotes greater trade liberalization.
In a theoretical model, Gros (1987) compared the e¤ects in terms of welfare of the existence of
various instruments of trade policy, including tari¤s and quotas, in the presence of intra-industry
trade. The author demonstrated that quotas are a commercial instrument equivalent to tari¤s in
situations where the market for quota allocation is competitive. Gros also calculated the rates
that tari¤s needed in order to have the same e¤ect as quotas on imports, and found that the rates
would be very high compared to what is empirically observed. The author concludes that this
is one reason why countries prefer to use quotas, because the protectionist impact of very high
tari¤s would be too obvious. In a complementary work, using a theoretical model, with three
activity sectors - an exporter, an importer, and a domestic non-tradable goods sector - Greenaway
and Milner (1988) point to the possibility that in a scenario where the intra-industry trade is
predominant, the incidence of trade protection would be in the non-tradable sector, traditionally
a more labor-intensive sector. Therefore, in this setting, exports may not be as a¤ected by the
imposition of tari¤s on imports as in the case of inter-industry trade.
Greenaway and Hine (1991) analyze a priori the possible e¤ects of the single European market,
put into place in 1992. The authors show that in the 1980s, the growth trend in the weight of
intra-industry trade of European countries that had occurred in previous decades, began to reverse,
reviving a trend of increasing importance of inter-industry trade. The authors argue that if there
is a predominance of this type of trade, the adjustment to the emergence of the single European
market will be more severely felt by countries. Additionally, the very creation of the single market
will bring an increase in the weight of this type of trade. The solution proposed was to eliminate
barriers, especially non-tari¤ barriers imposed on the secondary sector, thereby promoting the
exploitation of economies of scale, and increasing the importance of intra-industry trade, which
has less severe consequences at the welfare level. When inter-industry trade is predominant,
countries and sectors typically are characterized by specic production factors, and if they have
no comparative advantage at the international level, will su¤er almost unrecoverable welfare losses.
Such an extreme case does not occur often at the level of intra-industry trade. The hypothesis
that the weight of intra-industry trade decreased and the weight of inter-industry trade increased,
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in the decade preceding the entry into operation of the single European market, was confronted by
Brülhart and Elliot (1998). Their results do not suggest that the e¤ect hypothesized will happen
in the years before 1992. However, the authors found evidence that high-technology industries
with robust growth rates tend to have a higher proportion of intra-industry trade, while declining
sectors tend to have a higher prevalence of inter-industry trade. The authors conclude that, since
their results are mixed, the hypothesis that intra-industry trade brings along easier adjustments
in situations such as the single European market has to be supported by a theoretical framework.
Clark (2002) performed an exercise similar to the two aforementioned studies (Greenaway
and Hine, 1991 and Brülhart and Elliot, 1998), but for the USA, evaluating the e¤ects of the
North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) for the period 1993-1998. The author used a
sectoral breakdown, provided by the 3-digit Standard International Trade Classication (SITC),
and concluded that the vast majority of the sectors analyzed increased the weight of intra-industry
trade following the entry into operation of NAFTA, and in only nine sectors had that weight
decreased, pointing to a minimally painful adjustment for the USA of the establishment of NAFTA.
A study of Vogiatzoglou (2006) also about NAFTA for the period 1992-2002, corroborated the
results of Clark (2002). Vogiatzoglou (2006) reached these conclusions, not only for the USA, but
also for Canada and Mexico.
Ratnayake and Jayasuriya (1991) obtained results contrary to those described above, i.e., the
e¤ect of tari¤s on intra-industry trade is signicant, while the opposite is not the case, contrary to
the studies presented. The authors use a simultaneous equations model to verify the causality be-
tween intra-industry trade and tari¤s and conclude that the traditionally-drawn conclusions about
intra-industry trade negatively inuencing the rates at which tari¤s are set, are estimated using
models in which only one equation is estimated. When two estimates are performed simultane-
ously, as the authors did using Australia as an example, the causality is reversed and the negative
relationship reported previously does not appear. The authors recommend doing more estimations
and tests before advocating that the intra-industry trade is more conducive to liberalization of
trade between countries. Menon and Dixon (1996) seek to answer the question opposite to that
posed in the preceding paragraphs - do regional trade agreements promote intra-industry trade?
- reaching a signicant and positive response, for Australia and New Zealand. Foster and Stehrer
(2011) use empirical data for the period 1962 - 2000 and a sample of 168 countries, to answer a
question similar to that proposed by Menon and Dixon (1996) - what is the e¤ect of preferential
trade agreements on the structure of trade? The answer indicates that the inclusion of a country
in these arrangements increases the weight of intra-industry trade. However, the e¤ect is greater
in high-income countries.
Also related to our work, Jørgensen and Schröder (2005) use a theoretical model to evaluate the
e¤ects on the welfare of ad valorem and specic tari¤s in a context where imperfect competition,
i.e., the existence of economies of scale, is predominant. They conclude that although we can
empirically demonstrate that countries prefer to use ad valorem tari¤s, as is the case in the
two regions that we analyze in this work, the welfare cost to the consumer is lower for specic
tari¤s. The authors recommend that the type of tari¤ to be chosen should take into account the
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characteristics of the sector in which it will be applied, especially in terms of market structure
and the ease of market entry and exit by rms.
Based on this literature review, this paper tests the existence of a negative association between
intra-industry trade and protectionism, at the empirical level in the USA and the EU, which
somehow escaped attention in the literature.
This work has the following structure: In Section 2 we describe the data used and in Section
3 we describe the methodology used for data analysis. In Section 4 we analyze the results and in
Section 5 the conclusions are presented.
2 Empirical Strategy
2.1 Data
We used two databases for this work, which will be described in this section.2 First, we used data
regarding tari¤s of the USA and EU, excluding the remaining trade policy instruments since these
are covered by di¤erent legislation and can take many forms. These trade policy instruments are
often camouaged by standards of safety and security of goods and people - especially for the USA,
where it is not possible to nd a single source of information in which they are compiled, although
the information was available for the EU in a single source. To ensure comparability between
the two blocs, we will consider only tari¤s. However, according to earlier studies cited in the
Introduction, for comparison between the two trading blocs, customs tari¤ is, of all instruments,
the one which raises the fewest problems. Therefore, our analysis is not compromised, since we
choose the instrument which allows a greater degree of comparability.
Data for the tari¤s were taken from the customs tari¤ of each country/region for the year
2009.3 The customs tari¤ includes 5052 groups of commodities, divided between sections and
chapters, identied by a 6-digit code under the Harmonized System (HS), systematically ranked
by order of progressive complexity, taking into account their degree of nish or their position in
the manufacturing process. The 6-digit classication of goods is common to all countries that
are part of the World Trade Organization (WTO), unlike the 8-digit classication, in which the
classication is di¤erent. Thus, for purposes of comparison we chose the 6-digit classication.
Chapters 98 and 99 of these customs tari¤s are residual, created for specic purposes, specic
to each country/region, and are distinct for the USA and EU. Chapter 98 - Complete Industrial
Plant - was withdrawn because the additional variables that we used in this analysis - data on
imports and exports - have no data for this chapter and it is also residual. For Chapter 99 -
Reserved for special uses determined by the competent Community authorities - it was decided to
put the code 999999 and tari¤ rate 0%, since it is the rate of most tari¤s applied in this chapter
for both regions.
The customs tari¤s of these two regions can be classied as ad valorem or specic. The rst
2The entire data set is available upon request.
3A detailed description of the tari¤s, sections, and chapters of them, can be found in the combined nomenclature
of goods associated with the customs tari¤s, developed by the World Customs Organization in its International
Convention on the Harmonized System (HS) of Commodity Description and Coding System, which came into force
on 01/01/1988.
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takes the form of a tax as a percentage of the value of imports of the product. So if the world price
is P  and the ad valorem rate is t, the domestic price of imported goods will be P dom = P (1+ t):
Ad valorem tari¤s have been subject to progressive reductions in the negotiations of the WTO.
Specic tari¤s are a xed rate per unit imported (ton, square meter, or other unit of measure),
regardless of the monetary value of this unit. So if the world price is P  and if the rate is t0, the
domestic price is P dom = P  + t0.
Second, we used data on exports and imports, hereinafter designated respectively by X and F ,
at current prices for the USA, EU, and the total for the World for 2009, disaggregated by 6-digit
product codes. The data for the EU came from the database Export Help Desk, from the Export
Trade database of the European Commission, from which we took data for exports and imports
from the EU-27 to extra EU-27 partners.4 For the USA and the total for the World, we use the
COMTRADE database.5
The statistical value, which is used for data on exports and imports, is the value calculated
at the national borders. The import values are registered with the CIF value of the goods (Cost,
Insurance, and Freight - include the transaction value of the goods and the value of services
performed to deliver goods from the border of the exporting country to the border of the importing
country), and the values for exports are registered with the FOB value of the goods (Free on Board
- include the transaction value of the goods and the value of services performed to deliver the goods
to the border of the exporting country).
As mentioned above, there are no statistics for the values of imports and exports of Chapter
98, since this chapter - Complete Industrial Plant - is used only in very exceptional cases.
2.2 Indicators of International Trade
In order to delve a bit deeper, we calculated the following indicators relative to 2009:
- Share of exports (X) and imports (F) of each product in total of exports and in the total of
imports, respectively : For exports =

Xji
Xi

for product j in country i, and for imports =

Fji
Fi

for
product j in country i. It allows us to assess which products have the greatest weight in exports
and imports.
- Coverage rate of exports:

Xj
Fj

is the ratio between exports and imports of a given product,
indicating the percentage of imports that is covered by exports. A coverage rate of more than 1
(or 100% if expressed as a percentage) means that the country has a strong commercial position
or trade competitiveness in terms of product j, while a rate of less than 1 indicates a weak trading
position or trade dependence of that product (negative trade balance in that product).
- Revealed Comparative Advantages Index : (RCAj) =

Xji
Xi


Xjp
Xp
 , for each product j, where i is
the countrys index and p is the region of comparisons index. RCA measures the intensity of
specialization in international trade of a country relative to a region or to the world. If the RCA
is greater than 1, the country reveals comparative advantage for exports of a particular product,
i.e., this country is relatively specialized in the export of this good. On the other hand, if the RCA
4The website is http://exporthelp.europa.eu.
5The database COMTRADE is available at http://comtrade.un.org.
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is less than 1, the country does not reveal comparative advantage in the export of that product.
- Grubel-Lloyd Index : (GLj) =
(Xj+Fj) jXj Fj j
Xj+Fj
. This indicator measures the proportion of
intra-industry trade in a given product, ranging between 0 and 1. If GLj = 1 there is only
intra-industry trade, while if GLj = 0 there is only inter-industry trade.
2.3 Cluster Analysis
In this section we describe the methodology used in this work. Given the goal of this study - to
analyze the Customs Tari¤ of the USA and the EU, in order to nd patterns within each customs
tari¤ that could be related to the type of trade (intra or inter) and also to compare the two
customs tari¤s - the methodological strategy followed was supported by clusters analysis.
We had several indicators to identify patterns within each region - share of exports, share of
imports, coverage rate of exports, RCA index , GL index (all quantitative variables), and also the
tari¤ (a variable categorized as ad valorem or specic).
After an exploratory analysis of the quantitative variables, we concluded (with the exception
of the GL index) that they were strongly asymmetric. Tests of asymmetry were performed and
the Z statistics obtained widely exceed the range ]-2; 2[ considering a 5% level of signicance.
We therefore decided to perform the clustering using only the GL index, in the case of quan-
titative variables. The remaining variables were then used to characterize the clusters.
The variable tari¤ was initially considered as an input for clustering. This variable was cate-
gorized as ad valorem or specic tari¤s, and therefore had to be treated as a qualitative variable.
This was not a problem because the two-step cluster analysis performs well with simultaneously
quantitative and qualitative variables. A problem arises from the fact that tari¤s have a very large
number of categories - 252 for the EU and 395 for the USA - making it statistically inoperable to
build clusters and consequently to nd patterns.
Through a hierarchical cluster analysis we grouped the products according to the GL index,
separately for USA and for EU. In order to obtain a robust solution we held the clustering aggre-
gation using three methods - the ward method, the furthest neighbor method, and the centroid
method.
Comparing the clustering results, a four cluster solution was xed (as can be seen in the
dendograms in Appendix A for the USA and the EU, using the ward method) and an optimization
method (K-Means) was then used in order to perform the nal segmentation of the GL index in
both universes in review. In Table 1 we can see the strong association between solutions obtained
via the hierarchical methods and the optimization method (K-means).
Table 1 - Association Between the Solutions with Four Clusters According to Di¤erent Methods
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis K-means USA K-means EU
Cramers V Cramers V
Ward Method 0.877 0.774
Furthest Neighbor 0.726 0.885
Centroid Method 0.892 0.894
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3 Results
In this section we analyze the results obtained from the cluster analysis, having used the GL Index
as a grouping variable and the remaining variables as characterizing the clusters founded.6
In Table 2 we see the nal composition of the four clusters in the USA and in the EU, as well
as the average value of the Grubel-Lloyd Index. The dimension of the clusters is quite similar
both between and within the two regions.7
Table 2 - Composition of the Four Clusters for the USA and the EU
Clusters USA EU
N % GL % GL
average average
Cluster 1 1135 22.5 0.375 1270 25.1 0.886
Cluster 2 1292 25.6 0.631 1342 26.6 0.380
Cluster 3 1309 26.0 0.882 1256 24.9 0.637
Cluster 4 1302 25.8 0.108 1184 23.4 0.129
Total 5038 100.0 0.503 5052 100.0 0.512
3.1 USA
In this section we analyze the results obtained with cluster analysis for the USA. The evidence
presented allows us to draw several important conclusions. All four clusters are relatively similar
in size, as shown in Table 2. Clusters 3 and 2 are the rst and second cluster respectively with the
highest values for the GL index (0.882 and 0.631) and above the USA average (0.503). Clusters 4
and 1 present the lowest values for the GL index (0.108 and 0.108) and below the USA average.
6Product distribution by cluster and respective tari¤s and other international trade indicators associated are
available upon request, since tables presenting these results were too large. In the following sections we show tables
and gures that summarize the characterization of the clusters.
7The USA has 14 fewer observations than the EU, due to the impossibility of calculating the GL Index for some
products.
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Table 3 - Ranking of the Sectors Relative to Cluster 3 for the USA (sectors that weight at least 2%)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Sect. Rank. Weight Rank. Weight Rank. Weight Rank. Weight
(%) (%) (%) (%)
84 1 8.2 1 12.8 1 16.4 8 2.5
85 3 4.3 2 6.3 2 8.3 14 1.8
29 2 6.7 3 6.1 3 5.8 1 7.8
72 6 3.1 5 3.7 4 4.0 9 2.4
90 8 2.8 4 4.8 5 3.7 63 0.5
73 10 2.3 8 2.9 6 3.7 29 1.1
28 4 4.1 7 3.1 7 3.1 6 2.8
48 12 2.1 10 2.4 8 2.7 28 1.1
39 7 2.9 6 3.4 9 2.4 22 1.3
40 14 2.0 12 1.8 10 2.1 36 0.9
87 27 1.1 19 1.3 11 2.0 20 1.5
55 9 2.6 9 2.6 15 1.5 12 1.9
52 5 3.1 11 2.0 12 1.8 5 3.1
3 11 2.2 32 0.9 31 0.8 4 4.5
62 22 1.4 35 0.8 55 0.4 2 6.3
61 25 1.1 18 1.4 35 0.8 3 5.0
2 43 0.6 46 0.6 52 0.4 7 2.7
44 18 1.7 26 1.1 24 1.1 10 2.2
Sectors 14, 97, 99 80, 79, 67, 66 65, 66 36, 49
with 0% 50, 45, 14 67, 99 97, 99
Note: The designation of the sectors are the following: 2 - Meat and edible meat o¤al, 3 - Fish and
crustaceans, molluscs, and other aquatic invertebrates, 28 - Inorganic chemicals: organic or inorganic
compounds of precious metals, of rareearth metals, of radioactive elements, or of isotopes, 29 - Organic
chemicals, 39 - Plastics and articles thereof, 40 - Rubber and articles thereof, 44 - Wood and articles
of wood; wood charcoal, 48 - Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper, or of paperboard,
52 - Cotton, 53 - Other vegetable textile; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn, 61 - Articles of
apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted, 62 - Articles of apparel and clothing accessories,
not knitted or crocheted, 72 - Iron and steel, 73 - Articles of iron or steel, 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers,
machinery, and mechanical appliances; parts thereof, 85 - Electrical machinery and equipment and parts
thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts
and accessories of such articles, 87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway rollingstock, and parts and
accessories thereof, 90 - Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical
or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof.
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Table 3 shows the ranking of the sectors (chapters in the terminology of the combined nomen-
clature) by cluster, taking into account the relative position of the sectors which weight at least 2%
in cluster 3 - the cluster in which the GL Index is higher.8 The remaining sectors that appear in
the table were then taken from cluster 2, then cluster 1, and then cluster 4, if they did not appear
in cluster 3 by the criteria established, but appear on the other clusters by the same criteria. In
this way we can compare all of the sectors in all of the clusters that represent at least 2% in the
cluster and compare their relative positions in the other clusters, even if their weight is less than
2%. For clusters 1 to 3, sectors 29, 84, and 85 are the most representative ones, and also sectors 28
and 72 to a lesser extent. In cluster 4, only sector 29 is among the ve most representative sectors.
Clusters 3 and 2 are the ones that share a more similar structure, then cluster 1, and nally cluster
4. Most of the sectors that appear as important in cluster 4 are residual in the other clusters, like
sectors 62, 61, 3, 52, 2, and 44. There are sectors that do not appear in some clusters (0% weight)
but are important in others9 , like sector 36, which has a 0.4% weight in cluster 1, sector 49, which
is relatively important in clusters 3 and 1 (0.6% weight), sector 50 in cluster 1 (it is worth 0.4%),
sector 65 in cluster 1 (0.5% of weight), sectors 66 (0.4%) and 67 (0.5%) in cluster 4, and nally
sector 97 in cluster 3 (0.5% of weight). In order to obtain further insights in this discussion, we
consider the taxonomy proposed by Peneder (2001), according to which the sectors are classied as
"mainstream", labor intensive", "capital intensive", "marketing driven", and "technology driven"
industries.10 According to this taxonomy, we veried that the most important sectors in clusters
3, 1, and 2 are mainly technology driven (and in some cases capital intensive), while some of the
most important sectors in cluster 4 are labor intensive or mainstream.
8Hereinafter we use the term Sector in lieu of the term Chapter.
9Sectors with 0% weight include: 14 - Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specied or
included, 36 - Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations, 45 -
Cork and articles of cork, 49 - Printed books, newspapers, pictures, and other products of the printing industry;
manuscripts, typescripts, and plans, 50 - Silk, 65 - Headgear and parts thereof, 66 - Umbrellas, sun umbrellas,
walkingsticks, seatsticks, whips, ridingcrops, and parts thereof, 67 - Prepared feathers and down and articles
made of feathers or of down; articial owers; articles of human hair, 79 - Zinc and articles thereof, 80 - Tin and
articles thereof, 97 - Works of art, collectorspieces, and antiques, and 99 - (Reserved for special uses determined
by the competent Community authorities).
10For further discussion on the importance of these taxonomies see, for instance, Peneder (2003).
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Table 4 - Weight of Tari¤s in Each Cluster for the USA (tari¤s that weight at least 1%)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Tari¤ Weight Tari¤ Weight Tari¤ Weight Tari¤ Weight
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Ad val. (3.7%) 4.5 Ad val. (3.7%) 3.3 Ad val. (3.7%) 3.5 Ad val. (6.5%) 3.2
Ad val. (6.5%) 2.9 Ad val. (6.5%) 2.8 Ad val. (6.5%) 2.7 Ad val. (3.7%) 2.7
Ad val. (3%) 2.1 Ad val. (2.5%) 2.4 Ad val. (2.5%) 2.5 Ad val. (5.5%) 2.5
Ad val. (5%) 1.7 Ad val. (3%) 1.8 Ad val. (3%) 2.4 Ad val. (16%) 1.5
Ad val. (2.5%) 1.7 Ad val. (5.5%) 1.6 Ad val. (2.7%) 2.1 Ad val. (10%) 1.3
Ad val. (14.9%) 1.6 Ad val. (2.7%) 1.6 Ad val. (5%) 1.8 Ad val. (6.4%) 1.2
Ad val. (4.2%) 1.5 Ad val. (4.2%) 1.5 Ad val. (3.1%) 1.8 Ad val. (6%) 1.2
Ad val. (5.5%) 1.1 Ad val. (5%) 1.3 Ad val. (4.4%) 1.7 Ad val. (14%) 1.1
Ad val. (4%) 1.1 Ad val. (3.3%) 1.3 Ad val. (4.2%) 1.7 Ad val. (14.9%) 1.0
Ad val. (12%) 1.0 Ad val. (14.9%) 1.2 Ad val. (14.9%) 1.5 Ad val. (5%) 1.0
Ad val. (10%) 1.0 Ad val. (4.4%) 1.2 Ad val. (5.5%) 1.1 Ad val. (3%) 1.0
Ad val. (6%) 1.0 Ad val. (4%) 1.1 Ad val. (3.9%) 1.1
Ad val. (12%) 1.0 Ad val. (2.8%) 1.1
Ad val. (6%) 1.0 Ad val. (3.8%) 1.0
Ad val. (5.3%) 1.0
Ad val. (3.1%) 1.0
Free 40.7 Free 40.5 Free 43 Free 37.3
As can be seen in Table 4, the cluster where the rate 0% is most frequent is cluster 3, in which
the GL index is higher and the cluster in which the proportion of this rate is lower is cluster 4,
the cluster with the smallest value for the GL index. In this table tari¤s are ranked by their
weight in the cluster and we show only those weights greater than or equal to 1%. The ad valorem
rates more representative in clusters where the GL index is higher, are lower on average than in
the clusters where the GL index is lower. The application of a given rate is, for almost all cases,
independent of cluster formation - for example, the rate of 3.7% is always applied to sectors 28
and 29, although in cluster 4 it is also applied to sectors 37 and 38; the rate of 6.5% is always
applied to sectors 29 and 39; the rate of 2.5% is always applied to sectors 40, 84, 85, and 87. The
RCA index reveals no clear pattern in the products taxed with the rates mentioned, and can be
below or above 1.
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Figure 1 - Median of the Four International Trade Indicators - USA
Note: We use the median for this Figure due to the extreme asymmetry of the international trade
indicators.
Figure 1 shows a characterization of the additional international trade indicators - share of
exports, share of imports, coverage rate of exports, and the revealed comparative advantage (RCA)
index in the four clusters. The two indicators that allow us to di¤erentiate between clusters are
the RCA index and the coverage rate of exports. The evidence shows that the coverage rate of
exports and the RCA index are the ones that are more di¤erentiated between clusters (when we
analyze the median). Cluster 4 is the most di¤erent concerning all four indicators. In the clusters
there are some products which are extreme outliers, i.e., record values for the indicators very
di¤erent from what is the median for each cluster.11 Clusters 1 and 4 show a greater proportion
of products that have extreme outliers in the four characterization indicators.
The clusters in which the GL is lower are also those in which the maximum value for the
RCA index is higher, revealing a behavior that agrees with what is expected at an interindustry
level, although the percentage of products that have a revealed comparative advantage is higher
in clusters 3 and 2 (43.09% and 41.8%, respectively).
11A case (yi) is an outlier if: Q3 + 1:5  IQR  yi < Q3 + 2  IQR or Q1   2  IQR < yi  Q1   1:5  IQR.
A case is an extreme outlier if: yi  Q3 + 2  IQR or yi  Q1   2  IQR and IQR = Q3  Q. IQR is the Inter
Quartile Range, i.e., the di¤erence between Quartile 3 and Quartile 1, corresponding to the central 50% of the
distribution. The distribution of severe outliers by cluster and indicator is available upon request, since the lists
were too long.
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Table 5 - Correlation Between the International Trade Indicators in Each Cluster in the USA
Share Coverage RCA GL
Cluster 1 of Rate of Good Good
Imports Exports
Share of Exports 0.747*** 0.301*** 0.603*** 0.115***
Share of Imports -0.314*** 0.146*** 0.060*
Coverage Rate of Exports 0.601*** 0.194***
RCA Good 0.117***
Share Coverage RCA GL
Cluster 2 of Rate of Good Good
Imports Exports
Share of Exports 0.906*** 0.214*** 0.535*** 0.031
Share of Imports -0.167*** 0.332*** 0.025
Coverage Rate of Exports 0.471*** 0.048*
RCA Good 0.010
Share Coverage RCA GL
Cluster 3 of Rate of Good Good
Imports Exports
Share of Exports 0.989*** 0.034 0.463*** -0.011
Share of Imports -0.101*** 0.442*** -0.013
Coverage Rate of Exports 0.134*** 0.050*
RCA Good 0.021
Share Coverage RCA GL
Cluster 4 of Rate of Good Good
Imports Exports
Share of Exports 0.295*** 0.486*** 0.619*** 0.158***
Share of Imports -0.620*** -0.319*** 0.266***
Coverage Rate of Exports 0.797*** 0.094***
RCA Good 0.074***
p<0.05 p<0.01  - p<0.001
Table 5 shows the correlations among the four additional indicators that assist in the char-
acterization of clusters after these have been grouped by GL, and also between the GL and the
four indicators. We calculated the coe¢ cient correlation of Spearmans Rho due to the extreme
asymmetry of the indicators in almost all clusters. These results suggest that the higher the GL
index, the higher the correlation between the share of exports and the share of imports and also
the correlation between the RCA index and the share of imports. The (negative) correlation be-
tween the coverage rate of exports and the share of imports is smaller in this case. In clusters
where the GL index is lower, results suggest that the correlation between the RCA index and the
share of exports is higher and also the correlation between the RCA index and the coverage rate
of exports, and the correlation between the coverage rate of exports and the share of exports.
The correlations between the GL index and the other indicators are higher (although still low) in
clusters in which the GL index is lower.
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To sum up, the results for the USA suggest an empirical relationship between intra-industry
trade and protectionism, as clusters that have a higher value for the GL index have on average
lower tari¤ rates.
3.2 EU
In this section we analyze the results for the EU. For ease of comparison between the two sections
we will follow the same order in the analysis. The four clusters are similar in size, as can be seen
in Table 2. Clusters 1 and 3 are the rst and second cluster respectively with the highest values
for the GL index (0.886 and 0.637) and above the EU average (0.512). Clusters 4 and 2 have the
lowest values for the GL index, 0.129 and 0.380, respectively.
Table 6 - Ranking of the Sectors Relative to Cluster 1 for the EU (sectors that weight at least 2%)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Sect. Rank. Weight Rank. Weight Rank. Weight Rank. Weight
(%) (%) (%) (%)
29 1 7.4 2 6.3 3 5.8 2 7.3
84 2 7.0 1 12.6 1 9.4 1 11.0
85 3 6.6 3 5.2 2 6.8 13 1.9
90 4 4.8 9 2.5 5 3.9 55 0.5
72 5 4.0 4 3.0 7 3.1 6 3.1
28 6 3.5 5 2.8 4 4.1 7 2.6
73 7 3.2 8 2.5 8 2.9 33 1.1
55 8 3.1 17 1.5 9 2.6 30 1.2
39 9 2.8 10 2.4 6 3.4 28 1.3
52 10 2.6 6 2.8 12 2.1 9 2.3
54 11 2.1 33 1.0 14 1.9 51 0.5
48 12 2.0 11 2.2 16 1.8 11 2.2
62 24 1.3 7 2.8 10 2.6 10 2.3
40 16 1.7 20 1.4 11 2.2 24 1.4
38 23 1.3 12 1.9 20 1.5 18 1.6
3 22 1.3 13 1.8 23 1.3 3 4.2
2 51 0.5 76 0.2 57 0.4 4 3.7
61 18 1.7 15 1.8 17 1.8 5 3.2
44 49 0.6 14 1.8 22 1.4 8 2.3
8 52 0.5 19 1.4 59 0.4 12 2.1
Sectors 4, 14, 46 46, 97, 99 67, 80, 99 13, 97, 99
with 0% 66, 67, 78
Note: The designation of the sectors are the following (we list here only the ones that did not appear in
Table 3) - 8 - Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits, or melons, 38 - Miscellaneous chemical products,
54 - Manmade laments; strip and the like of manmade textile materials, 55 - Manmade staple bers.
Let us consider now the evidence shown in Table 6. For clusters 1 to 3, sectors 29, 84, and
85 are the most representative ones, and also sectors 28 and 72 to a lesser extent. In cluster 4,
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only sectors 29 and 84 are among the ve most representative sectors. Clusters 1 and 3 are those
that share a more similar structure, then cluster 2, and nally cluster 4. Most of the sectors that
appear as important in cluster 4 are residual in the other clusters, like sectors 3, 2, 61, 44, and
8. There are sectors that have a weight of 0% in some clusters but have a signicant importance
in others12 , like sector 4, which has a 1.6% and 0.4% weight, respectively in clusters 4 and 2,
sector 13 that is relatively important in cluster 1, sector 46 in cluster 4 (0.8% of weight), sector
67 in cluster 4 (0.5% of weight), and nally sector 78 (0.3%) in cluster 2. Results regarding the
taxonomy proposed by Peneder (2001) are very similar to those obtained for the USA.
Table 7 - Weight of Tari¤s in Each Cluster for the EU (tari¤s that weight at least 1%)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Tari¤ Weight Tari¤ Weight Tari¤ Weight Tari¤ Weight
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Ad val. (2.7%) 9.1 Ad val. (6.5%) 8.7 Ad val. (2.7%) 9.6 Ad val. (1.7%) 6.8
Ad val. (6.5%) 8.2 Ad val. (1.7%) 8.2 Ad val. (6.5%) 8.4 Ad val. (12%) 6.4
Ad val. (8%) 7.7 Ad val. (2.7%) 7.7 Ad val. (8%) 7.4 Ad val. (6.5%) 5.9
Ad val. (1.7%) 4.8 Ad val. (8%) 6.4 Ad val. (1.7%) 6.5 Ad val. (5.5%) 4.5
Ad val. (5.5%) 4.6 Ad val. (12%) 5.7 Ad val. (5.5%) 4.5 Ad val. (2.7%) 3.7
Ad val. (12%) 4.1 Ad val. (5.5%) 4.2 Ad val. (12%) 4.3 Ad val. (4%) 3.6
Ad val. (4%) 4.1 Ad val. (4%) 4.2 Ad val. (3.7%) 3.7 Ad val. (8%) 2.9
Ad val. (3%) 2.7 Ad val. (3.7%) 2.9 Ad val. (4%) 3.6 Ad val. (2.2%) 1.8
Ad val. (3.7%) 1.1 Ad val. (5%) 1.6 Ad val. (5%) 1.9 Ad val. (3.7%) 1.6
Ad val. (4%) 1.1 Ad val. (2.2%) 1.6 Ad val. (3%) 1.9 Ad val. (4.7%) 1.3
Ad val. (3.2%) 1.7 Ad val. (3.2%) 1.3 Ad val. (2.2%) 1.8 Ad val. (2%) 1.0
Ad val. (5%) 1.5 Ad val. (2%) 1.3 Ad val. (3.2%) 1.2
Ad val. (2.2%) 1.4 Ad val. (6%) 1.0 Ad val. (6%) 1.0
Ad val. (7.5%) 1.2 Ad val. (4.7%) 1.0 Ad val. (4.7%) 1.0
Ad val. (6%) 1.1 Ad val. (3%) 1.0 Ad val. (4.5%) 1.0
Ad val. (5.3%) 1.1 Ad val. (3.5%) 1.0
Ad val. (2%) 1.0
Free 24.4 Free 24.4 Free 23.4 Free 30.2
As documented in Table 7, the cluster where the rate 0% is more represented is cluster 4, in
which the GL index is lower, and the cluster in which the proportion of this rate is lower is cluster
3, the cluster with the second highest value for the GL index. The ad valorem tari¤s do not seem
to reveal a clear pattern between the rates and the GL index. The application of a given rate is,
for almost all cases, independent of cluster formation - for example, the rate of 1.7% is always
applied to sector 84, the rate of 5.5% is always applied to sectors 28 and 29, the rate of 12% is
always applied to sectors 61, 62, and 63. The RCA index reveals no clear pattern in the products
taxed with the rates mentioned, and can be below or above 1.
12These sectors include, and we list only the ones which did not appear in Table 3: 4 - Dairy produce; birdseggs;
natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specied or included, 13 - Lac; gums, resins and
other vegetable saps and extracts, 46 - Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware
and wickerwork, and 78 - Lead and articles thereof.
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Concerning the four characterization indicators (Figure 2), the coverage rate of exports is the
only indicator that is more di¤erentiated between clusters (when we analyze the median). Cluster
4 is the most di¤erent concerning all four indicators. Clusters 2 and 4 show a greater proportion
of products that have extreme outliers in the four characterization indicators, except for the RCA
index.
Clusters 2 and 3 have the highest percentage of products with a revealed comparative advantage
higher than 1 (48.66% and 46.5%, respectively). The relationship between the GL index and the
RCA index does not seem to follow any clear pattern.
Figure 2 - Median of the Four International Trade Indicators - EU
Note: We use the median for this Figure due to the extreme asymmetry of the international trade
indicators.
The results shown in Table 8 suggest that the higher the GL index, the higher the correlation
between the share of exports and the share of imports and also the correlation between the RCA
index and the share of imports. The (negative) correlation between the coverage rate of exports
and the share of imports is smaller in this case. In clusters where the GL index is lower, results
suggest that the correlation between the RCA index and the share of exports is higher and also the
correlation between the RCA index and the coverage rate of exports, and the correlation between
the coverage rate of exports and the share of exports. The correlations between the GL index and
the other indicators are higher (although still low) in clusters in which the GL index is lower.
Given the results, the relationship between the degree of intra-industry trade and the level of
protectionism found in economic theory, does not seem to t the European case. This conclu-
sion for the case of the EU, should be interpreted cautiously, however, as the empirical exercise
conducted in this case considers only the extra-EU trade. Therefore, the intra-EU trade - the
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most important one, representing more than 80% - is not included, which may lead to less robust
results.
Table 8 - Correlation Between the Four Indicators in Each Cluster in the EU
Share Coverage RCA GL
Cluster 1 of Rate of Good Good
Imports Exports
Share of Exports 0.987*** 0.137*** 0.316*** -0.063*
Share of Imports -0.009 0.279*** -0.061*
Coverage Rate of Exports 0.239*** -0.046
RCA Good -0.043
Share Coverage RCA GL
Cluster 2 of Rate of Good Good
Imports Exports
Share of Exports 0.718*** 0.362*** 0.542*** 0.066**
Share of Imports -0.285*** 0.021 0.073**
Coverage Rate of Exports 0.670*** -0.149***
RCA Good 0.049*
Share Coverage RCA GL
Cluster 3 of Rate of Good Good
Imports Exports
Share of Exports 0.901*** 0.281*** 0.399*** -0.005
Share of Imports -0.105*** 0.171*** 0.034
Coverage Rate of Exports 0.556*** -0.217***
RCA Good -0.041
Share Coverage RCA GL
Cluster 4 of Rate of Good Good
Imports Exports
Share of Exports 0.227*** 0.563*** 0.689*** 0.240***
Share of Imports -0.587*** -0.294*** 0.278***
Coverage Rate of Exports 0.781*** -0.045
RCA Good 0.175***
p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.001
3.3 USA - EU Comparison
In this section we perform a comparative analysis between the two regional economic blocs, given
the results presented in the previous two sections.
The value of the GL index is very similar to the two regions - 0.512 and 0.503 respectively for
the EU and the USA - and the values found for the clusters are also similar, although the order
in which they appear are di¤erent, as can be seen in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 - Average for the GL of Goods for the USA and the EU
The clusterssectoral compositions are similar for clusters 1 to 3 in both the USA and the EU,
with the predominance of sectors 29, 84, and 85, and also 28 and 72 in a lesser extent, although
the ranking position in the cluster is not the same (but very similar). Cluster 4 is di¤erent in
both cases, and only sector 29 (in the case of the USA) and 29 and 84 (in the EU) are common
to the other clusters. In the USA the most representative sectors of cluster 4 (which are residual
in the other clusters) include 62, 61, 3, 52, 2, and 44, and in the EU include 3, 2, 61, 44, and 8.
Therefore, cluster 4 shows a higher degree of dissimilarity, in terms of sectoral composition, both
within and between the USA and the EU. Even so, sectors 52 and 62 are still representative in
other EU clusters. Sector 8 for the EU is the only one specic. In both regions sectors 14, 80, and
99 are almost nonexistent in all clusters. Sectors 66 and 97 are irrelevant in all EU clusters but
not in all of the USA clusters, and sectors 45 and 79 are irrelevant in all USA clusters and also
have a small weight in all EU clusters.
When we apply the taxonomy proposed by Peneder (2001), we verify that the results are
consistent for the two cases under analysis. Specically, clusters in which the GL index is lower are
mainly labor intensive or mainstream, while clusters in which the GL is higher are predominantly
technology driven or capital intensive.
Additionally, it should be noted that the USA Customs Tari¤ is less protectionist than the
European, registering a much higher percentage of products in which the rate of customs duty is
0% and noting also that ad valorem rates are on average always lower (and smaller in terms of
weight). These ndings are in line with those reported by Bouët et al. (2008) and also Guimbard
et al. (2012), discussed in the Introduction. In the USA the clusters with a higher GL index
have, on average, lower ad valorem tari¤ rates (the more representative ones) and also a larger
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proportion of 0% tari¤ rate. In the EU, the tari¤ rates do not seem to reveal a clear pattern of
relationship with the GL index. For both the USA and the EU the application of a given tari¤
rate is independent of cluster formation, but not of sectors. Also, in both economic regions the
RCA index reveals no clear pattern in the products taxed and its relationship with the tari¤ rates.
Figure 4 - Median of the Four International Trade Indicators for the USA and the EU
For the USA the coverage rate of exports and the RCA index are indicators that distinguish
very well between clusters, but for the EU only the coverage rate of exports allows the distinction
between clusters. Additionally, the coverage rate of exports for the EU is much higher in all
clusters than the ones found for the USA, as seen in Figure 4. The indicators share of exports and
share of imports do not show very distinctive characteristics. The median of the coverage rate
of exports for the EU shows signicant changes between the four clusters, ranging from 1 to 7.5.
On the other hand, the same indicator for the USA shows very similar values, in the range of 0
to 1. Cluster 4 in both regions is the cluster that stands out in terms of the international trade
indicators. The clusters with a large proportion of extreme outliers are those where the GL index
is lower, for both regions.
The proportion of products in all clusters for the EU that have an RCA index of more than
one is much higher than in the USA, standing between 42.6% and 48.7% of the products, while
for the USA the range is between 31.8% and 43.1%. In the USA, when the GL index is lower in
the cluster the RCA index is higher, but in the EU this relationship is not very clear.
Additionally, in the two regions, the higher the value for the GL index, the higher the cor-
relation between the share of exports and the share of imports weight, which is obvious because
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of the way the GL index is calculated. Also, the higher the GL index, the lower the (negative)
correlation between the share of imports and the coverage rate of exports, becoming almost zero,
because when there is intra-industry trade, imports and exports can have similar shares.
Finally, according to what has been discussed above, the USA seems to have a relationship
between intra-industry trade and protectionism, more conniving with economic theory, while for
the EU the results are not conclusive.
4 Conclusion
This work analyzes the relationship between the degree of intra-industry trade and the level of
protectionism. Additionally, we draw a comparison between the customs tari¤s of two regional
economic blocs - the USA and the EU - with respect to the degree of protectionism inherent in
them.
Through a cluster analysis, and using the Grubel-Lloyd index (which assesses the degree of
intra-industry trade) as the grouping variable to form clusters, we dene four clusters for each
region, which were later characterized with indicators of international trade and the customs tari¤s
for the two regions.
The results show a signicant di¤erence in the tari¤s applied between the USA and the EU,
with the USA presenting a lower level of protectionism. Additionally, the results for the USA show
a positive relationship between the degree of intra-industry trade and a lower level of protectionism,
while for the EU the results are not conclusive, showing therefore that results are case-specic,
and more research is needed, in order to assess the robustness of these conclusions, for other spaces
and periods.
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5 Appendix A
Figure A1 - Hierarchical Agglomeration by the Ward Method for GL in the USA
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Figure A2 - Hierarchical Agglomeration by the Ward Method for GL in the EU
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